

STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
INTERROGATIONS AND SEARCHES

FNF
(LEGAL)

SEARCHES OF
STUDENTS

Students shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials. School officials may search a student's outer clothing, pockets, or property by establishing reasonable cause or securing the student's voluntary consent. Coercion, either expressed or implied, such as threatening to contact parents or police, invalidates apparent consent. *U.S. Const., Amend. 4.; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985); Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F.Supp. 223 (1980)*

A search is reasonable if it meets both of the following criteria:

1. The action is justified at the inception; i.e., the school official has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will uncover evidence of a rule violation or a criminal violation.
2. The scope of the search is reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the search in the first place; i.e., the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and are not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985)

RANDOM DRUG
TESTING

Whether a particular search is reasonable is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Thus, the reasonableness of a random student drug-testing policy is determined by balancing the following factors:

1. The nature of the privacy interest compromised by the drug-testing policy.
2. The character of the intrusion imposed by the drug-testing policy.
3. The nature and immediacy of the governmental interests involved and the efficacy of the drug-testing policy for meeting them.

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995) (upholding a policy requiring urinalysis drug testing as a condition of participating in athletics); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002) (upholding a policy requiring urinalysis drug testing as a condition of participating in competitive extracurricular activities)

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SEARCHES OF
TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS /
ELECTRONIC
DEVICES

A person is prohibited from obtaining, altering, or preventing au-
thorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage by:

1. Intentionally accessing without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided; or
2. Intentionally exceeding an authorization to access that facility.

EXCEPTIONS

This section does not apply with respect to conduct authorized:

1. By the person or entity providing a wire or electronic commu-
nications service;
2. By a user of that service with respect to a communication of
or intended for that user; or
3. By sections 18 U.S.C. 2703, 2704, or 2518.

18 U.S.C. 2701(a), (c)

ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION

“Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature trans-
mitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-
electronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce. *18 U.S.C. 2510(12)*

ELECTRONIC
STORAGE

“Electronic storage” means:

1. Any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and
2. Any storage of such communication by an electronic commu-
nication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication.

18 U.S.C. 2510(17)

Messages that have been sent to a person, but not yet opened, are
in temporary, intermediate storage and are considered to be in
electronic storage. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United
States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). Electronic
communications that are opened and stored separately from the
provider are considered to be in post-transmission storage, not
electronic storage. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352
F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2004).

USE OF TRAINED
DOGS

Trained dogs’ sniffing of cars and lockers does not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment. The alert of a trained dog to
a locker or car provides reasonable cause for a search of the lock-
er or car if the dog is reasonably reliable in indicating that contra-

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band is currently present. The District need not show that the dog is infallible or even that it is reliable enough to give probable cause.

Trained dogs' sniffing of students does constitute a search and requires individualized reasonable suspicion.

Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982)